(DP 2003-06) Incentives in Contracts for Public Sector Projects with Private Sector Participation

Renato E. Reside, Jr.

Abstract


Optimal contracts are derived from a simple model where government guarantees two types of private investors participationg in infrastructure projects. With asymmetric information, investors are offered a pair of incentive-compatible contracts covering production, tariff, and guarantee coverage. Both contracts offer identical production quantities, but the contract designed for high risk investors offers over-insurance and tariff below marginal cost, while the contract designed for low risk investors offers under-insurance with tariff above marginal cost, while the contract designed for low risk investors offers under-insurance with tariff above marginal cost. This benchmark outcome may motivate solutions to adverse selection, incentive and risk-sharing problems in contracts involving private sector participation in infrastructure development projects in the Philippines.

Full Text:

PDF

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.