Formal Models of the Political Resource Curse

by

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20 Friday 2017, Friday
4:00-5:00 p.m. – Rm 303

Abstract:
By surveying formal models, I demonstrate that the political resource curse is the misallocation of revenues from natural resources and other windfall gains by political agents. I show that the curse always exists if political agents are rent-seeking, since mechanisms of government accountability, e.g. electoral competition, the presence of political challengers, and even the threat of violent conflict, are inherently imperfect. However, the scope for rent-seeking becomes more limited as the competition over political power that threatens the incumbent government becomes more intense.

About the author:
Dr. Desiree A. Desierto specializes in the political economy of development. After obtaining an MSc in Development Economics from the University of Oxford and a PhD in Economics from the University of Nottingham, she became Robert M. Solow Postdoctoral Fellow at the Cournot Centre in Economic Studies in France, Visiting Scholar at the University of Cambridge, and Associate Professor at the University of the Philippines. Desiree is currently the Rule of Law Fellow of the WSD HANDA Center for Human Rights and International Justice at Stanford University, and a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.